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Abstract
Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant com-
pensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive eﬀects
of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and ﬁnancing decisions
critically depend on the design of the SOP. A speciﬁc problem in designing SOPs
concerns dividend protection. Usually, SOPs are not dividend protected, i.e. any
dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence
shows that this results in a signiﬁcant decrease in the level of corporate dividends
and, at the same time, into an increase in share repurchases. Yet, few sugges-
tions have been made on how to account for dividends in SOPs. This paper
applies arguments from principal-agent-theory and from the theory of ﬁnance to
analyze diﬀerent forms of dividend protection, and to address the relevance of
dividend protection in SOPs. Finally, the paper relates the theoretical analysis
to empirical work on the link between share repurchases and SOPs.
JEL classiﬁcation: D82, G30, G35
Keywords: Executive stock options, managerial incentives, dividends, share re-
purchases, dividend protection
¤This paper has been presented at the EURO-Meeting 2001, section on corporate governance and
contract theory, in Rotterdam.1 Introduction
Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the largest single component of
executive compensation in the US in recent years.1 Their popularity in Europe is also
increasing.2 The most important incentive design features of an SOP are the exercise
price, the number of options granted, the term of the options, the vesting period and
trading windows, and whether the options are dividend protected.3
Stock option compensation only rewards stock-price appreciation, but does not ac-
count for dividends: The value of an option decreases with every dividend payout.
Dividend protection of an SOP refers to the idea of compensating managers for divi-
dend payouts, for example by adding accumulated dividends plus interest to the stock
price upon exercise of the underlying options. In practice, ﬁrms rarely oﬀer dividend
protected SOPs.4 The literature usually attributes this lack of dividend protection in
the US to the accounting treatment of dividend protected options.5
Non-dividend protected SOPs imply strict incentives for managers to cut dividends
and to substitute them for a share repurchase, an alternative to cash dividends which
does not adversely aﬀect the options’ value. Lambert/Lanen/Larcker (1989) ﬁnd em-
pirical evidence that managers signiﬁcantly reduced the dividend level compared to
the estimated level after they had been awarded stock options. Additionally, there is
a striking parallel between the recent growth in SOPs and ﬁrms’ use of share repur-
chases. Share repurchases have risen substantially in the US over the last two decades.
Jolls (1998) reports ratios of repurchases to dividends of 1:12 in 1980-84, and of 1:3 in
1See Hall/Liebman (1998); Murphy (1999). Today, SOPs usually account for more than 50 % of
the executive compensation in large US ﬁrms. See Rappaport (1999), p. 91.
2For example, all ﬁrms in the german DAX30 have installed an SOP.
3See e.g. Carpenter (2000), Hall/Murphy (2000a;b) for analyses of the incentive eﬀects of diﬀerent
exercise prices, Hall/Murphy (2000b) for the term of options and the vesting period, and for dividend
protection the references in section 3.
4Murphy (1999) reports 7 dividend protected SOPs in a sample of 618. In Germany, the fraction of
dividend protected SOPs is relatively large; Winter (2000) documents dividend protection for about
a third of all German SOPs.
5See e.g. Fenn/Liang (2001), Kahle (2002). According to US-GAAP, dividend protected options
are considered to be variable-plan options and the cost of these options have to be recorded as an
expense in the ﬁnancial statement, whereas the cost of (non-dividend protected) ﬁxed-plan options
only have to be disclosed in the footnotes of the ﬁnancial statement. We do not believe that the
accounting treatment of SOPs provides a suﬃcient legitimation for the widespread omission of dividend
protection. However, the accounting and tax treatment of SOPs may explain the popularity of many
other design features (such as the exercise price), see e.g. Long (1992). Whether these features can
be rationalized from an incentive standpoint is an open issue.
11992-96. A further surge in stock repurchases can be observed for the years following
this period.6 At the same time, stock price based compensation has signiﬁcantly in-
creased, mainly due to the growth in SOPs.7 The empirical observations suggest that
the incentive eﬀects of non-dividend protected SOPs with respect to corporate payout
policy are signiﬁcant.8
From an incentive perspective, SOPs have two main goals: Motivating managers
to increase their eﬀorts, and aligning managers’ with shareholders’ interests to induce
“better” investment decisions. If, without agency conﬂicts between shareholders and
managers, dividend policy were irrelevant from the shareholders’ perspective, “ideal”
incentive contracts would guarantee dividend irrelevance from a manager’s perspective
as well. On the other hand, dividend relevance from a manager’s perspective implies
that investment and payout decisions are related and thus, in general, dividend rele-
vance leads to investment decisions that are not in the shareholders’ best interest.9
This paper has two main purposes: First, to examine how SOPs should be de-
signed to provide incentives for dividend decisions in the best interest of shareholders.
Second, to show that neither ﬁnancial investment opportunities (as an alternative to
distribute cash) nor share repurchases (as an alternative to dividends) can substitute
for dividend protection. Therefore, we ﬁrst analyze diﬀerent alternatives of dividend
protection under simplifying assumptions. Applying arguments developed throughout
this analysis, we subsequently discuss the role of ﬁnancial investment opportunities and
stock repurchases. Finally, we provide additional insights into the theoretical basis of
the rapidly inreasing amount of empirical work concerning the link between dividends,
stock repurchases and SOPs.
Our principal ﬁndings are these: Dividend protection, by compounding dividends
with a (deterministic or stochastic) interest rate, say r¤, and adding them to the stock
price when the options are exercised, “forces” the manager into a portfolio problem:
The manager has to allocate the cash ﬂow of the relevant period, which is his “bud-
get”, to two investment opportunities. He can either reinvest cash ﬂows in the ﬁrm (a
6See Weisbenner (2000), p. 1. Empirical evidence for Germany does not yet exist because
stock repurchases have been strictly limited until the “Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im
Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG)” became eﬀective in 1998.
7From 1993 to 1998 stock market compensation nearly doubled.
8For alternative explanations of the increase in share repurchases see section 4.2.
9The same holds with respect to corporate ﬁnancing decisions. See, for example, Brander/Poitevin
(1992), Garvey/Mawani (1998), John/John (1993).
2risky investment opportunity), or he can invest them at a rate r¤ by paying out divi-
dends. If r¤ is deterministic, the manager’s problem is similar to a standard portfolio
problem with one risky and one riskless asset. If r¤ is stochastic, the manager has to
allocate cash ﬂows to two risky investments. In either case the manager’s solution to
his portfolio problem will generally not be optimal from the shareholders’ perspective,
and none of the suggestions in the literature on how to design dividend protection is
without drawbacks. A stochastic, ﬁrm-independent interest rate (like the return of a
peer group) tends to induce better (but not ﬁrst best) dividend decisions than a de-
terministic interest rate. First best incentives could only be provided by compounding
with the stock return of the ﬁrm, if there were no information asymmetries between
managers and shareholders. However, if managers have superior information, using
the stock return to compound dividends will result in over- or underinvestment. Based
on the analysis of alternative forms of dividend protection, it is subsequently shown
that abstaining from dividend protection generally causes adverse investment incen-
tives even if managers have alternative payout or investment opportunities. Neither
stock repurchases as a payout alternative to dividends nor ﬁnancial investment oppor-
tunities (as an alternative to value-reducing investments) are satisfactory substitutes
for dividend protection. Finally, it is shown how the analysis helps to explain empirical
results about share repurchases.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present our
model. Section 3 presents and analyzes diﬀerent forms of dividend protection under
the simplifying assumption that the manager can only pay out dividends or invest
cash ﬂows in real investment projects. In section 4 we expand the analysis to ﬁnancial
investments and stock repurchases as alternative investment opportunities and payout
instruments. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
To emphasize the relationship between SOPs and payout policy, we assume that the
considered ﬁrm is all equity ﬁnanced. The ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows belong to a given risk class
with cost of capital k. The capital market is perfect and all shareholders have homo-
geneous expectations with respect to the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows from investments.
Consequently, if managers acted as perfect agents of shareholders, the Miller-Modiglini
3dividend irrelevancy theorem would hold. For simplicity, we assume that, at time t=0,
the (representative) manager is granted European call options on the ﬁrm’s stock that
expire at time t = 2. Let the options’ exercise price X be deterministic (no indexing).
We do not analyze the incentive eﬀects of the SOP on the manager’s decisions during
the ﬁrst period but focus on his investment and payout decision at time t = 1. At that
time the manager can either invest cash ﬂows CF in the ﬁrm or distribute them to the
shareholders. Accordingly, the payout D is bounded to 0 · D · CF, and the amount
CF ¡ D is retained and invested internally.10
The manager may have insider-information which is strictly superior to that of the
shareholders, i.e. he may have information about future cash ﬂows of already realized
or planned projects and he may anticipate projects not yet known to the shareholders.
The manager has no access to capital markets: He can neither trade in shares of his ﬁrm
nor in any other securities on his own account. This trading restriction is imposed to
rule out that the manager’s expectations enter the pricing process through his trading
activities.11 Nonetheless, the manager’s insider-information may be (partially) revealed
to the shareholders through his payout decision: By observing the manager’s payout
decision (how much he disburses and whether he pays dividends or repurchases shares)
the shareholders can make inferences about the manager’s information and beliefs (see
section 4.3)12 The fact that the manager’s decisions convey information to the market
in turn has consequences for these decisions. To simplify these complex issues, we ﬁrst
rule out the possibility to buy back shares and to invest cash ﬂows into ﬁnancial assets
when analyzing diﬀerent alternatives of dividend protection. Section 4 expands the
analysis to account for these alternatives.
Therefore, in the following assume that the manager can either pay out cash ﬂows
as dividends or invest them in real investment projects of the given risk class. Let
Kc
1 be the price (cum dividend) of the considered ﬁrm at t = 1 before the manager
announces his payout decision, and Ke
1 the price ex- dividend. If the manager retains
10D < 0 would imply a nominal capital increase (not a stock issue). Many of the following results
can be easily applied to this case.
11Moreover, some restrictions on the manager’s access to capital markets are necessary for incentive
contracts to be eﬀective, and it rules out the possibility that the manager values his options at market
values, see e.g. Meulbroek (2001).
12The model we use is similiar to the model of Myers/Majluf (1984). They describe a setting
in which the manager - acting in the interest of the “old” shareholders - has to decide about the
realization of investment projects which will be ﬁnanced by issuing new stock. As stock repurchases
are inverse to common stock issues, many results of Myers/Majluf can be applied to our model.
4and internally invests cash ﬂows CF ¡D, the shareholders estimate the corresponding
projects’ expected returns. Let the shareholders’ estimate, which is known to the
manager ex ante (i.e. before the dividend announcement), be p. Thus, Ke
1 carries
more information than Kc
1 whenever D < CF. If p = k, the manager’s dividend
announcement has no price eﬀect, and Ke
1 = Kc
1 ¡ D. If p 6= k instead, the price ex
dividend is given by
(1) K
e
1 = K
c
1 ¡ CF + (CF ¡ D)
1 + p
1 + k
= K
c
1 ¡ D + (CF ¡ D)
p ¡ k
1 + k
In general, there will be a diﬀerence in ﬁrm valuation between the manager and the
shareholders due to the manager’s superior information. Such diﬀerences in valuation
are of fundamental importance for the evaluation of stock price based compensation.
Diﬀerences in stock valuation result from diﬀerences in the valuation of future cash
ﬂows from existing projects as well as from the fact that the manager anticipates
projects which are not yet commonly known. Valuation diﬀerences also refer to those
investment opportunities at t = 1 which the manager ﬁnances with retained cash ﬂows.
As the manager’s information is assumed to be superior, he calculates a “true”
or “intrinsic” market value of the ﬁrm, and, in his eyes, the stock may be over- or
underpriced. To model diﬀerences in valuation, assume that the price cum dividend at
t = 2, e Kc
2 results from the following process:
(2) e K
c
2 = (K
e
1 + ∆)(1 + e r)
(3) with e r = i + ¯(e m ¡ i) +e "
We adopt a simple market model to explain the return of period two, e r, where ¯ is
the ﬁrm’s systematic risk, i the riskless rate of return, e m the market return and e " a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc noise term with mean zero. The expected return is given by
(4) k ´ E(e r) = i + ¯ [E(e m) ¡ i]:
∆ represents the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s intrinsic value and its market price at
time t = 1 due to the manager’s superior information. (2) implies that this diﬀerence
will be resolved during the second period.13 If the shareholders had the manager’s
13Of course, the manager might have superior information which will not be publicly known at time
t = 2. In this case, the manager always has an incentive to communicate his information to the market
if his ﬁrm is underpriced.
5superior information at time t = 1, intrinsic value would equal market value and the
stock return would be e r in the second period. But with ∆ 6= 0, the stock return,
denoted by e x, is diﬀerent from e r. Though e r is the shareholders’ best guess with respect
to the return in period 2, the actual stock return is given by
(5) x =
Kc
2
Ke
1
¡ 1 = r +
∆
Ke
1
(1 + r)
Accordingly, Ke
1 ¢ (1 + k) is the shareholders’ best guess with respect to the price at
t = 2, whereas the manager’s expectation is (Ke
1 + ∆) ¢ (1 + k). According to the
potential sources for diﬀerences in valuation, we decompose ∆ into
(6) ∆ = ∆ + ∆p with
(7) ∆p =
pM ¡ p
1 + k
(CF ¡ D)
∆ either represents the diﬀerences in valuation between manager and shareholders with
respect to future cash ﬂows of projects realized in the past, or the value of projects
anticipated by the manager but not yet known to shareholders. By deﬁnition, these
diﬀerences in valuation do not depend on the manager’s payout decision at t = 1. In
contrast, ∆p depends on the payout decision, as it represents the diﬀerence in valuation
referring to the investment projects at t = 1 that are ﬁnanced with the retained cash
ﬂows CF ¡ D. (7) implies that the manager values these projects’ returns (which are
assumed to be identical for simplicity) at pM, whereas the shareholders estimate it to
be p. The valuation diﬀerence ∆p is one of the principal reasons why shareholders
should delegate investment decisions to managers; it simultaneously rules out trivial
solutions to the agency problem (e.g. a forcing contract). As both ∆ and the noise
term e " enter the formula for the stock return, ∆ cannot be unambiguously inferred
from e x.
The shareholders are aware of the fact that the manager has superior informa-
tion, and they would share his beliefs if they had his information. Hence, from their
perspective the ﬁrst best-dividend policy is given by
(8) D
fb(pM) =
8
<
:
0 for pM > k (retain all cash ﬂows)
arbitrary for pM = k
CF for pM < k (distribute all cash ﬂows)
i.e., the ﬁrst best dividend level is a step function of pM.
6We assume that the manager is an expected utility-maximizer with utility function
U(W). Let the manager’s wealth f W at t = 2 be limited to his income from the SOP.14
Without dividend protection, f W is given by
(9) f W = max
n
® ¢ (f Kc
2 ¡ X);0
o
= ® ¢ max
n
f Kc
2 ¡ X;0
o
where ® is the share in the ﬁrm’s stock that corresponds to the number of options
granted to the manager.
After substituting (6), (7) and (1) into (2), e Kc
2 can be written as
e K
c
2 =
³
K
c
1 ¡ CF + (CF ¡ D)
1 + pM
1 + k
+ ∆
´
(1 + e r) (10)
= (K
e
1M + ∆)(1 + e r)
where
(11) K
e
1M = K
c
1 ¡ CF + (CF ¡ D)
1 + pM
1 + k
Ke
1M would represent the intrinsic (or “true”) stock price ex dividend from the man-
ager’s perspective, if there were no diﬀerences in valuation except those concerning
projects realized at t = 1.
As is easily seen from (10) and (11), any dollar paid out as a dividend and not
invested in projects with expected return pM reduces the stock price at t = 2 by
1 + pM
1 + k
(1 + e r) ¢ D
Thus, without dividend protection, the manager will retain and invest all cash ﬂows as
long as pM > ¡100%.
3 Alternative forms of dividend protection15
3.1 The basic principle
Recall that, in order to simplify the analysis, we excluded share repurchases and the
purchase of ﬁnancial assets from the analysis so that the manager’s alternatives are
14Lambert/Larcker/Verrecchia (1991) consider portfolio eﬀects between diﬀerent compensation el-
ements as well as welfare eﬀects resulting from non-variable compensation.
15Some results of this section are based on the unpublished master thesis of M. Arnold. See Arnold
(2000), pp. 57-90.
7restricted to dividend payouts and investments in real projects of a given risk class.
In general, dividend protection can be formalized by adding (1 + r¤)D to the stock
price f Kc
2 at time t = 2, where r¤ is a predeﬁned interest rate, set by the sharehold-
ers.16 Equivalently, the exercise price can be reduced by the compounded dividend.17
Substituting (10) into (9), we obtain for the manager’s compensation:
(12) f W = ® ¢ max
n
(K
e
1M + ∆)(1 + e r) ¡ [X ¡ D(1 + r
¤)];0
o
Surprisingly, the issue of dividend protection has been largely neglected in the the-
oretical literature on SOPs. However, two suggestions for dividend protection have
been made. Menichetti (1996) suggests compounding dividends with the ﬁrm’s cost of
capital, r¤ = k. Wenger/Kaserer/Knoll (1999) suggest increasing the number of shares
per option according to the number of additional shares a shareholder could buy from
the dividend received. This form of dividend protection, which is called “Op´ eration
blanche”, corresponds to using the realized stock return e x as interest rate r¤, as will
be shown in section 3.4. Both suggestions will be discussed below.18
As was shown in section 2, any dividend payout D decreases the manager’s com-
pensation by
1+pM
1+k (1 + e r) ¢ D if the SOP is not dividend protected. As can be seen
from (12), inducing the ﬁrst best dividend policy according to (8) would require setting
r¤ = e r: If payed out dividends were compounded with e r, the manager’s compensation
at t = 2 would be given by
(13) f W = ® ¢ max
©
(K
e
1M + ∆)(1 + e r) ¡ [X ¡ D(1 + e r)];0
ª
Substituting Ke
1M into (13) yields
f W = ® ¢ max
½
£
K
c
1 ¡ (CF ¡ D)
k ¡ pM
1 + k
+ ∆
¤
(1 + e r) ¡ X;0
¾
.
16Alternatively, the manager can directly participate in the dividend payout, i.e. he receives ® ¢ D
when he distributes the dividend to the shareholders. There are two diﬀerences between this alternative
and the dividend protection analyzed in our model. First, if dividends plus interest are added to f Kc
2,
this income is at risk (as the options will not end up in the money with probability one). Second, if
the dividend is directly paid out to the manager, he decides himself about r¤ whereas the shareholders
determine the relevant interest rate if they opt for the form of dividend protection we consider.
17This will be the easiest way to implement dividend protection in practice. Note however, that
in this case dividend protected SOPs are no longer ﬁxed-plan options, which has consequences with
respect to their accounting treatment. See footnote 5.
18If D < 0 “dividend protection” implies that every capital increase raises the exercice price by
D(1 + r¤). This refers to the question of imputing interest charges on invested capital.
8Consequently, with r¤ = e r, the ﬁrst best dividend policy Dfb(pM) is a dominant strat-
egy for the manager: If pM = k, f W is independent of D. If pM < k (pM < k), D = CF
(D = 0) maximizes f W for any realization r.19 Moreover, if r¤ = e r, the payout decision
would be independent of ∆, eliminating any eﬀect of valuation diﬀerences between
manager and shareholders on the manager’s payout decision.
As it depends on both the noise term " and the valuation diﬀerence ∆, r can neither
be directly observed nor isolated from the realized stock return. Apparently, using e x
would induce optimal incentives only if ∆ = ∆p = 0 (and therefore e x = e r), that is only
if the manager had no superior information about investment prospects in the ﬁrm.
In contrast, setting r¤ = e x is problematic whenever ∆ 6= 0 or ∆p 6= 0, in other words
whenever the manager has superior information and the shareholders have good reason
to delegate investment decisions to the manager.
3.2 Deterministic interest rate
First consider dividend protection with a deterministic interest rate, denoted by r¤
d.
From the manager’s perspective, the payout decision is equivalent to a portfolio prob-
lem: He has to allocate the “budget” CF among a riskless (by distributing a dividend)
and a risky investment opportunity (by investing in his ﬁrm), with (expected) rates
of return r¤
d and pM, respectively. The manager’s decision variable is D, the amount
invested into the “riskless asset” (or, alternatively, CF ¡D, the amount invested in the
“risky asset”). This portfolio problem diﬀers from a standard portfolio problem20 in
two respects: (i) As the manager holds options, the income from dividend protection
is not riskless: he will only receive compounded dividends if his options end up in the
money. (ii) The manager allocates additional funds: Through his SOP a big fraction of
his wage is already “invested” in the risky investment, i.e. in his ﬁrm. From (i) it fol-
lows that the manager’s payout decision generally depends on how deep the manager’s
options are in the money and thus on the ﬁrm value at time t = 1. (ii) complicates
comparative static analyses, which will not yield the same results as the analysis of a
standard problem.
19This dominance arises since we have assumed that all cash ﬂows are of a given risk class and
because we restrict the lower bound of the cash ﬂows (of the stock return) to 0 (¡1).
20For an analysis of the corresponding standard problem see, for example, Merton (1982), pp.
602-618.
9In the appendix, the manager’s portfolio problem is analyzed in more detail. Under
quite general assumptions, the optimal dividend level that solves this portfolio prob-
lem is a smooth function of pM or of the diﬀerence pM ¡k, respectively. The manager
maximizes his expected utility by trading oﬀ the additional return from investing into
the riskless asset with return r¤
d against the additional risk and return from retaining
cash ﬂows and investing into the risky asset, with expected rate of return pM. In con-
trast, the ﬁrst best dividend level Dfb(pM) is discontinuous at pM = k, see (8), which
demonstrates the general problem of using a deterministic interest rate for dividend
protection: It is not possible to design a dividend protection with a deterministic inter-
est rate r¤
d that induces a payout policy which depends as extremely on the diﬀerence
between pM and k as the ﬁrst best policy (8). As a consequence, payout incentives
induced by a deterministic interest rate are always suboptimal. If r¤
d is low, the man-
ager may reinvest cash ﬂows even if pM < k (overinvestment). On the other hand, if
r¤
d is high, the manager may pay out cash ﬂows even if pM > k (underinvestment). In
general, r¤
d has to be ﬁxed in a way to minimize the expected welfare loss due to these
suboptimal incentives. Whether a certain r¤
d tends to result in over- or underinvestment
of course also depends on the SOP’s other design features, especially on the exercise
price, and on the manager’s risk preferences.
A suggestion by Menichetti (1996) which is described in more detail by Schwetzler
(1999)21 says that the deterministic interest rate r¤
d should be set equal to the ﬁrm’s
cost of capital k. This implies that if the manager can realize projects with pM = k
he has two investment opportunities with equal returns one of which is risky, the
other certain. Obviously, Menichetti’s proposal generally results in underinvestment,
since the manager has strong incentives to pay out cash ﬂows as long as his options
are not far “underwater” (in this latter case the risk incentive from the options may
overcompensate the attractiveness of dividend payouts).22
From the above arguments it additionally follows that dividend protection cannot
be designed irrespective of the other SOP design features, especially the exercise price.
As the probability of the options ending up in the money depends on the diﬀerence
between the market price Kc
1 at t = 1 and the exercise price X, the manager’s decision
21See Menichetti (1996), p. 1690, Schwetzler (1999), p. 340.
22Therefore, Schwetzlers opinion (see Schwetzler (1999), p. 340) that setting r¤
d = k ensures man-
agerial payout decisions in the best interest of shareholders has to be questioned.
10to pay out also depends on this diﬀerence. The larger the diﬀerence between Kc
1 and
X, the deeper in the money the manager’s options are, and the more the manager’s
risk aversion aﬀects his payout decision. On the other hand, the smaller the probability
of the manager’s options ending up in the money, the larger the risk incentive from
the manager’s options, which again aﬀects his payout decisions. At an optimum, the
interest rate for dividend protection thus has to be state contigent. Speciﬁcally, for a
given exercise price, the optimal r¤
d tends to be the smaller, the larger Kc
1 is. A second
reason for r¤
d to be state contingent is wealth eﬀects.
3.3 Stochastic, ﬁrm-independent interest rate
Next consider a stochastic, ﬁrm-independent interest rate, such as an index return, or
the return of a peer group, and denote it by e r¤
I. We will turn to the stock return as a
ﬁrm-dependent stochastic interest rate in the next section.
Assume for example that the return of a peer group e rI is available which has the
same ¯ as the ﬁrm but is not exposed to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. As E(e rI) = k), using this
return for dividend protection implies that the manager, faced with internal investment
opportunities with expected return pM = k, can avoid ﬁrm speciﬁc risk without any loss
in expected return by paying out dividends instead of investing cash ﬂows in the ﬁrm.
Consequently, the expected return on dividend payouts should generally be smaller
than k. Therefore, deﬁne the interest rate used for dividend protection as:
(14) e r
¤
I = i + ¯(e m ¡ i) ¡ ¸ = e rI ¡ ¸
i.e. as the return of the peer group reduced by ¸. With this interest rate, the manager’s
compensation is
f W = ® ¢ max
©
(K
e
1M + ∆)(1 + e r) ¡ [X ¡ D(1 + e r
¤
I)];0
ª
(15)
= ® ¢ max
©
(K
e
1M + ∆)(1 + e r) ¡ [X ¡ D(1 + e r)] ¡ D(e " ¡ ¸);0
ª
The reduction in the expected return is similar to choosing r¤
d < k in the case of a
deterministic interest rate. This can be generalized: If the shareholders use a stochastic
interest rate which is not perfectly correlated with e r, its expected value generally
must not be equal to the cost of capital k. As with a deterministic interest rate, the
manager faces a portfolio problem, now referring to the allocation of a given budget
11(CF) to two risky investment opportunities. In the appendix, we analyze this portfolio
problem in more detail. There, we also address the question of whether a stochastic
interest rate e r¤
I performs better than a deterministic rate r¤
d. It is shown that, under
quite general assumptions, the use of e r¤
I does indeed induce superior payout decisions.
Speciﬁcally, with e r¤
I instead of r¤
d being used for dividend protection, the dividend level
that maximizes the manager’s expected utility is more sensitive to pM, and so the
manager’s choice of D more strongly depends on the diﬀerence pM ¡ k, resulting in
a better approximation of the ﬁrst best dividend policy given by (8). In general, e r¤
I
will perform better, the closer it is correlated with e r. The intuition behind the result
is simple: the stronger e r¤
I and e r are correlated, the less dependent the manager’s risk
premium is on his choice of D, and the more his decision will depend on the diﬀerence
in the expected returns of his investment opportunities, i.e. retaining and internally
investing cash ﬂows or paying dividends, respectively.
Though using e r¤
I instead of a deterministic rate tends to improve incentives, still
no optimal solution can be achieved, as any ﬁrm-independent return cannot account
for the ﬁrm speciﬁc risks e ". The only way to account for these risks is to use the
stock return of the ﬁrm as the interest rate for dividend protection, which leads to the
following section.
3.4 The stock return
Wenger/Kaserer/Knoll (1999) propose the so-called “Op´ eration blanche” for dividend
protection. According to the “Op´ eration blanche”, the number of shares per option is
increased according to the number of additional shares a shareholder could buy from
the dividend received.23
If a shareholder holds a fraction z of the ﬁrm’s equity, he receives a dividend pay-
ment of z ¢ D. With a stock price ex dividend of Ke
1, the number of additional shares
he can buy with z ¢ D is given by z ¢ D
Ke
1. If the manager’s options correspond to a
fraction ® of the ﬁrm’s equity, the “Op´ eration Blanche” gives the manager additional
® ¢ D
Ke
1 options for a payout D. For the value of the underlying shares at t = 2 (cum
23See Wenger/Kaserer/Knoll (1999), p. 488. Winter’s description of how to account for dividends
in SOPs is equivalent to the “Op´ eration blanche”. See Winter (2000), p. 181.
12dividend) we obtain:
(16) ®
µ
1 +
D
Ke
1
¶
¢ e K
c
2 = ®
Ã
e K
c
2 + D ¢
e Kc
2
Ke
1
!
= ®
£ e K
c
2 + D ¢ (1 + e x)
¤
From (16) we see that the “Op´ eration Blanche” is equivalent to adding D ¢ (1 + e x) to
the stock price at t = 2, i.e. equivalent to compounding dividends with the realized
stock return of the second period.
As the manager can either pay out dividends or invest internally, with dividend
protection based r¤ = e x the manager has two investment opportunities with perfectly
correlated returns. Apparently, the ““Op´ eration Blanche”” would be the optimal so-
lution to our problem if e x = e r, that is if there was no diﬀerence in valuation between
manager and shareholders (∆ = 0). As was noted in section 2, diﬀerences in valuation
result from the manager’s superior information both with respect to projects realizable
at t = 1 (∆p) and to future cash ﬂows of both already realized projects and projects
anticipated by the manager but not yet known to the shareholders (∆). In the ﬁrst
case the valuation diﬀerence depends on the payout decision, whereas in the second
it does not. Recall that diﬀerences between the market price and the intrinsic value
of the ﬁrm at t = 1 ( ∆ and/or ∆p), are assumed to be temporary and hence will be
resolved at the end of period 2.
First, ignore diﬀerences in the valuation of projects realizable at t = 1, i.e. assume
∆p = 0, pM = p, and consider the case ∆ > 0: From the manager’s perspective, the
ﬁrm is underpriced at time t = 1 and the manager expects a stock return E(e x) > k
for period 2. Now, as the two alternatives have perfectly correlated returns, paying
out dividends will dominate internal investments with expected return pM · k, and
the “Op´ eration Blanche” results in underinvestment, as the manager may pay out
dividends even if pM > k. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm is overpriced (∆ < 0 and
E(e x) < k), the manager tends to overinvest, since even a project with expected return
pM slightly lower than k will dominate a dividend payout.
The “Op´ eration blanche” will result in over- or underinvestment even if diﬀerences
in valuation are exclusively related to those projects that are to be ﬁnanced with re-
tained cash ﬂows (recall that without such diﬀerences, there is no reason for delegating
the investment and payout decisions at t = 1 to the manager). To see this, assume
∆ = 0, but ∆p 6= 0. Inserting (10) and r¤ = e x into (9), we obtain for the manager’s
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(17) f W = ® ¢ max
½·
K
c
1 ¡
CF¡D
1 + k
[k¡pM ¡
D
Kc
1
(pM¡p)]
¸
¢ (1+e r) ¡ X;0
¾
According to (17), the payout decision has two eﬀects on the manager’s compensation,
represented by the terms ¡CF¡D
1+k (k¡pM) and CF¡D
1+k ¢ D
Kc
1(pM¡p), respectively. The ﬁrst
eﬀect reﬂects the proﬁtability of the real investment projects and directs the manager
towards the ﬁrst best dividend policy: If pM = p (and so CF¡D
1+k ¢ D
Kc
1(pM ¡p) = 0),
Dfb(pM) would be a dominant strategy for the manager. The second eﬀect applies
only if 0 < D < CF: If he distributes all cash ﬂows so that D = CF, there is by
deﬁnition no information eﬀect on the stock price. If he retains all cash ﬂows so that
D = 0, the interest rate for dividend protection is irrelevant. The second eﬀect reﬂects
the diﬀerence in the valuation of projects to be realized at t = 1 between shareholders
and manager: If the manager retains cash ﬂows (but not all, i.e. 0 < D < CF) and
invests them internally, the expected stock return and thus the return on distributed
cash ﬂows for the manager, is
E(e x) = k +
(CF ¡ D)(pM ¡ p)
Ke
1
which diﬀers from k whenever pM 6= p. As the second eﬀect is negative if pM < p,
the manager can eliminate it by setting D = 0 or D = CF. As either case will
always maximize the ﬁrst eﬀect, there is no conﬂict of interest between manager and
shareholders whenever pM < p, that is whenever shareholders overvalue the projects to
be ﬁnanced. Things change if pM > p: In this case, there is an interior maximum for the
second eﬀect, and so the manager will underinvest if pM > k (the manager suboptimally
pays out some dividend) and will overinvest if pM < k (he suboptimally retains some
cash ﬂows). The more “pessimistic” the shareholders, the more the manager’s dividend
policy will deviate from ﬁrst best.
If the shareholders cannot distinguish between diﬀerent sources of misvaluations
(∆ and ∆p) the inference from the manager’s payout decision on his expectations is
very limited.24 As a result, even if we take into account the informative eﬀect of the
manager’s decisions, the desribed adverse investment incentives tend to prevail.
24For example, the shareholders cannot conclude from a complete payout that the ﬁrm is underpriced
from the manager’s perspective (∆ > 0) as they do not know whether there are any valuable projects
at all.
14Summing up, dividend protection with the “Op´ eration blanche” tends to be prob-
lematic if the shareholders have good reason to believe that the manager values the
ﬁrm diﬀerently. The “Op´ eration blanche” may even be problematic if the diﬀerence in
valuation only concerns projects to be ﬁnanced with the retained cash ﬂows at t = 1.
4 Dividend protection, ﬁnancial investment
opportunities and stock repurchases
4.1 Financial investment opportunities
A straightforward and simple argument questioning the need for dividend protection is
as follows: If capital markets are perfect, which we assumed, shareholders can simply
allow managers to purchase ﬁnancial assets, e.g. invest retained cash ﬂows at the risk-
less interest rate. Now, retaining cash ﬂows will not imply value-reducing investment
decisions made by the manager if he prefers ﬁnancial to real investments if (and only
if) pM < k. Financial investment opportunities remain largely unconsidered in both
the theoretical and the empirical literature on SOPs.25
Assume that the manager can purchase a riskless asset with return i. Further
assume that he is not restricted with respect to this investment, i.e. that he is allowed
to invest all cash ﬂows CF into the riskless asset. From the manager’s perspective, this
ﬁnancial investment opportunity is equivalent to a dividend protection of the SOP with
deterministic interest rate r¤
d = i. Obviously, a (explicit) dividend protection is now
at best irrelevant. The same holds with respect to risky ﬁnancial investments in the
ﬁrm and dividend protection with a stochastic interest rate. However, the analyses in
sections 3.2 and 3.3 have shown that it is questionable whether optimal interest rates
for dividend protection, whether deterministic or stochastic, will equal the returns of
bonds or risky assets traded on capital markets. This becomes apparent especially when
we compare investments in risky ﬁnancial assets with a dividend protection based on a
stochastic interest rate. As was argued, the optimal rate e r¤
I carries a negative premium
¸ on its expected return to account for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks not inherent in the index
(benchmark) portfolio. In general, a risky asset with the desired characteristics will
not be available on an arbitrage-free market. Additionally, the riskless interest rate
25Neus (1996) analyzes linear incentive contracts and shows that ﬁnancial investment opportunities
adversely aﬀect the manager’s motivation.
15available at the market, will only by chance be equal to the deterministic interest rate
that is optimal for dividend protection.
Consequently, ﬁnancial investment opportunities represent an implicit but generally
suboptimal substitute for dividend protection. For SOPs to induce ﬁrst best dividend
decisions, other design features, such as the exercice price, will then have to be designed
(if possible) such that the adverse incentives from ﬁnancial investment opportunities
will be compensated. The degree of freedom lost hereby will have a negative impact on
other incentive eﬀects. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, it is generally advanta-
geous for the shareholders to (implicitly or explicitly) restrict the manager’s corporate
ﬁnancial investment opportunities and simultaneously include dividend protection into
the SOP.
4.2 SOPs and share repurchases
So far, we have not taken into account share repurchases. Share repurchases are an
alternative way to distribute cash to shareholders which, in contrast to a dividend
payout, do not adversely aﬀect the value of the manager’s options. So, if the manager
can choose between paying out cash in form of dividends or a share repurchase, he will
strictly prefer the repurchase. As a consequence, we expect managers to systematically
substitute share repurchases for dividends when compensated with non-dividend pro-
tected SOPs. Kahle (2002) refers to this reasoning as the substitution hypothesis. The
substitution hypothesis provides an explanation for the striking parallel between the
growing importance of SOPs as compensation instruments and the change in corporate
payout policy from dividends to repurchases in recent years. Of course, there are other
explanations for this link. A straightforward explanation is the “funding hypothesis”
(Kahle, 2002, pp. 240-241): Whenever managers or other employees exercise options,
the ﬁrm as the option writer has to provide the necessary (underlying) shares, and so
the considered manager may repurchase shares for this reason.26
The empirical link between SOPs and share repurchases is well documented.27 The
empirical evidence supports both the funding and the substitution hypothesis: Ac-
26Alternatively, ﬁrms can issue new stock. Share repurchases may be preferred because they do
not dilute EPS, which is still frequently used for ﬁrm valuation in practice. See Kahle (2002), pp.
240-241, Weisbenner (2000), pp. 6-8. As Kahle (p. 240) points out, the economic rationale for the
funding hypothesis is “unclear”.
27See Fenn/Liang (2001), Jolls (1998), Weisbenner (2000), Klassen/Sivakumar (2001), Kahle (2002).
16cording to Liang/Sharpe (1999) and Weisbenner (2000), increases in stock repurchases
are signiﬁcantly positively related to the number of SOPs for non-executive employ-
ees. Assuming that these employees have little inﬂuence on corporate payout decisions,
this supports the funding hypothesis. Additionally, Weisbenner (2000) observes that
executive SOPs are related with both stock repurchases and retained earnings, which
conﬁrms the substitution hypothesis as well as the ﬁndings in Lambert/Lanen/Larcker
(1989). The results in Fenn/Liang (2001) and Jolls (1998) are also consistent with the
substitution hypothesis. Kahle (2002) explicitly controls for the two hypothesis by dif-
ferentiating between executive and non-executive SOPs. She ﬁnds evidence conﬁrming
both hypotheses.
Accounting for share repurchases, like ﬁnancial investment opportunities, leads to
a simple argument questioning the need for dividend protection in SOPs: shareholders
can simply tell managers to buy back stock as a substitute for dividend protection
in the SOP. In fact, if shares are repurchased at market prices, the repurchase yields
return e x and thus is equivalent to a (explicit) dividend protection according to the
“Op´ eration Blanche”. The “Op´ eration Blanche” has been analyzed in section 3.4.
There, it was shown that it results in adverse investment incentives whenever the
manager has information which is superior to (more generally: which is not identical to)
that of the shareholders. Consequently, share repurchases induce suboptimal dividend
and payout decisions whenever there is asymmetric information between manager and
shareholders. Share repurchases are in the shareholders’ best interest only if they prefer
the “Op´ eration Blanche” to any other form of dividend protection. If not, they may
prefer to restrict the manager’s payout alternatives and establish a (explicit) dividend
protection in the SOP.
The argument that share repurchases can substitute for dividend protection be-
comes even more questionable if one accounts for the fundamental diﬀerence between
dividends and share repurchases. Though they are equivalent for the manager, they
are not equivalent for shareholders: Dividend distributions are “pro rata”, i.e. every
shareholder receives a fraction of D according to his share in the ﬁrm’s equity. Accord-
ingly, a share repurchase is only equivalent to dividends if all shareholders participate
pro rata in the repurchase. If otherwise they do not participate pro rata in the buy-
back, the repurchase, unlike dividends, will result in a reallocation of wealth among
shareholders whenever the ﬁrm is over- or undervalued. The omission of dividend pro-
17tection “forces” the manager into a repurchase if he prefers distributing cash ﬂows to
investing them internally. As a result, it can be in the interest of the shareholders
not to discriminate dividends but to install an explicit dividend protection to make
dividends a more attractive payout alternative for the manager.
4.3 Revelation of information through payout decisions
In section 3.4, analyzing the “Op´ eration Blanche”, we have noted that the manager’s
payout decision does not reveal much of his superior information to the market, if his
alternatives are restricted to distributing dividends or retaining and internally investing
cash ﬂows. As for the manager, a share repurchase is equivalent to dividend protection
with the “Op´ eration Blanche”, the same holds for the case of a non-dividend protected
SOP and the manager’s choice between a share repurchase and investments in real
projects. Note that this implies that the “substitution” hypothesis described in the
preceding section does not predict any signalling eﬀects of share repurchases.
The situation changes if we additionally consider ﬁnancial investment opportunities
and/or dividend protection with a ﬁrm-independent interest rate. Now, the manager
has an alternative which the shareholders correctly value. As a consequence, his de-
cision in general will convey information to the market. For example, assume that
at time t = 1, the manager can either internally invest retained cash ﬂows, or pur-
chase ﬁnancial assets, or pay out dividends, and that his SOP is dividend protected
according to the Op´ eration blanche. Note that, from the manager’s perspective, this is
equivalent to assuming that the SOP is not dividend protected, but that the manager
may repurchase shares. Irrespective of real investment opportunities, the manager will
tend to retain cash ﬂows (and purchase ﬁnancial assets) if the ﬁrm is overpriced, i.e. if
∆ < 0, since ∆ < 0 implies a relatively low stock return in period 2 which makes the
dividend payment under “Op´ eration Blanche” (the repurchase) less attractive. Hence,
in this case, retaining cash ﬂows and purchasing ﬁnancial assets on average signals to
the market that the ﬁrm is overpriced. On the other hand, a share repurchase, when
shareholders know that the manager could alternatively retain cash ﬂows and purchase
ﬁnancial assets, on average signals underpricing. However, the corresponding price re-
action is adversely aﬀected by the fact the shareholders generally cannot attribute share
repurchases to the manager preferring a repurchase to ﬁnancial investments. For ex-
18ample, ﬁnancial investments may be restricted, or the manager may repurchase shares
for other reasons such as the funding motive described above.28 Of course, the market
reactions to a repurchase, if anticipated by the manager, in turn aﬀect his strategy.
A thorough analysis of the information eﬀects of a manager’s payout and investment
decisions when he is compensated with stock options (whether dividend protected or
not) is beyond the scope of this paper.
Market reactions to share repurchases have been extensively analyzed in the em-
pirical literature. The announcement of share repurchases are “good” news and cause
signiﬁcant stock price increases.29 Recent studies also refer to the role of SOPs.30
With respect to the role of SOPs, market reactions to a share repurchase should
be expected to be more signiﬁcant, in relation to how precisely shareholders can infer
managerial motives from the decision to repurchase shares. This inference tends to
be less precise particularly when the manager’s alternatives (both with respect to
investment and to payout decisions) are restricted, and other motives for a repurchase
are probable, such as the funding motive. This indicates that empirical studies of
share repurchases (i) should account for SOPs, (ii) should, like Kahle (2002), try to
distinguish between managerial motives to increase option values and simple funding
motives for employee SOPs, and (iii) should try to account for ﬁnancial investments.
Recent empirical ﬁndings not only point out the link between SOPs and share
repurchases. They can also be seen as evidence for the need for dividend protection in
SOPs, as long as it is accepted that share repurchases, driven by managers’ incentives
to avoid depreciation of their option values, will generally not be in the shareholders’
best interest.
5 Conclusion
Dividend protection of SOPs is largely ignored in theory and practice regardless of the
fact that abstaining from dividend protection causes adverse investment incentives.
Neither stock repurchases as a payout alternative nor corporate ﬁnancial investment
28In turn, a dividend protection with a ﬁrm-independent interest rate may improve the shareholders’
ability to infer the manager’s information from his payout decision.
29See e.g. Dann (1981); Vermaelen (1981, 1984); Comment/Jarrell (1991); Iken-
berry/Lakonishok/Vermaelen (1995); Otchere/Ross (2001).
30See Klassen/Sivakumar (2001); Kahle (2002).
19opportunities can completely eliminate the need for dividend protection.
In the literature, few suggestions have been made on how to design dividend pro-
tection. Two of them were discussed in the paper. The suggestion to compound
dividends with the cost of capital k should generally be rejected. The second sug-
gestion, the so-called “Op´ eration Blanche”, would represent an ideal solution only if
there were no informational asymmetries between manager and shareholders. Adverse
investment incentives for the more realistic case of informational asymmetries are dif-
ﬁcult to predict. Then, dividend protection based on a ﬁrm-independent stochastic
interest rate, for example linked to the performance of a peer group, may be preferred
by the shareholders.
Actually, the theoretical analysis of the relationship between SOPs and payout de-
cision reﬂects a more fundamental problem: Incentive contracts designed to increase
managerial motivation and to induce “good” investment decisions should be indepen-
dent of corporate ﬁnancing decisions if it is expected that such decisions have relatively
small inﬂuence on ﬁrm value. However, it is an open question whether it is possible to
design such incentive contracts.31
Finally, the analysis of our paper shows that the eﬀect of diﬀerent SOP design
features, such as indexing options or dividend protection, have to be analyzed simulta-
neously in order to account for their impacts on investment policy as well as on ﬁnancing
decisions. This would require an integrated analysis of the incentive eﬀects of SOPs
with respect to diﬀerent agency-problems, which cannot be found in the literature up
to now.
31For a discussion of this question referring to equity issues, see Dybvig/Zender (1991) and Persons
(1994).
20Appendix: The manager’s portfolio problem
Deterministic interest rate r¤
d
We start with the manager’s expected utility in case of a dividend protection with the
deterministic interest rate r¤
d. Normalizing U(W) to U(0) = 0, the manager’s expected
utility is given by
E
£
U(f W)
¤
=
Z
rX
U
¡
®
©
(K
e
1M + ∆) ¢ (1 + r) ¡ [X ¡ D(1 + r
¤
d)]
ª¢
f(r)dr
with rX ´
X ¡ D(1 + r¤
d) ¡ (Ke
1M + ∆)
Ke
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(A-1)
Denote the dividend level that maximizes (A-1) by Dopt. Under quite general con-
ditions, Dopt is a smooth function of pM. This implies that the manager’s dividend
decisions will deviate from the ﬁrst best policy, which is a step function with step at
pM = k. Diﬀerentiating (A-1) with respect to D gives:
(A-2)
@E
£
U(f W)
¤
@D
= ® ¢
Z
rX
U
0(W) ¢
·
1 + r
¤
d ¡
1 + pM
1 + k
(1 + r)
¸
¢ f(r)dr
Assume that the second-derivative @2E
h
U(f W)
i
=@D2 is negative in [0;CF]. Then,
E[U(f W)] either has an interior maximum (0<Dopt <CF), or a boundary maximum
at Dopt=CF (the manager would prefer to pay out even more than CF) or at Dopt=0
(the manager would prefer to invest internally even more than CF). Obviously, in either
case, the manager’s dividend decision generally is suboptimal from the shareholders’
perspective. Deﬁne the conditional density b f(r) =
f(r)
1 ¡ F(rX)
(with
R
rX
b f(r)dr = 1) and
insert b f(r) into (A-2) to receive:
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where ˆ E(¢) = E(¢ je r ¸ rX) represents the operator for conditional expectations (such
that, in ˆ E(¢), realizations of e r are weighted with b f(r)). An interior maximum satisﬁes
(A-3) ˆ E
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d ¡
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= 0
This ﬁrst order condition corresponds to the ﬁrst order condition for a standard port-
folio with one riskless and one risky asset known from portfolio theory.32(A-3) allows
32In fact, for 1 ¡ F(rX) ¼ 1 and pM = k, (A-3) simpliﬁes to the standard condition
E fU0(W) ¢ (e r ¡ r¤
d)g = 0. See Merton (1982), p. 604.
21comparative static analyses of the manager’s dividend decision. Though, these anal-
ysis are complicated by the fact that the manager (i) holds a nonlinear claim on his
portfolio, and that he (ii) already has ”invested” a large part of his wealth in the risky
asset. Thus, consider ﬁrst the simple case of pM = k and rX ¼ 0, i.e. assume that
internal investments yield mean returns equal to k and that the options end up in the
money with probability 1. Then, (A-3) can be rewritten as follows:33
(A-4) E
©
U
0(f W) ¢ (r
¤
d ¡ e r)
ª
= E[U
0(f W)] ¢ (r
¤
d ¡ k) ¡ Cov[U
0(f W);e r] = 0
Cov[U0(f W)e r] < 0 due to the manager’s risk aversion. Therefore, 0<Dopt<CF only if
r¤
d<k in this simple case.
rX depends on X and Kc
1. The larger X and the smaller Kc
1, the larger is rX, the
lower is the probability that the options will be in the money at t = 2, the stronger will
be the risk incentives from the option, and the more attractive will be internal (risky)
investments as opposed to dividend payouts. Consequently, the optimal r¤
d tends to
be the higher, the larger rX, and it follows (i) that the optimal dividend protection
and the optimal exercice price cannot be determined independently, and (ii) that the
optimal r¤
d will be dependent on the stock price at t = 1. Additionally, as the manager’s
compensation is expected to be the higher the higher is the stock price Kc
1 at t = 1,
dividend protection has to account for wealth eﬀects. If wealth eﬀects are present
(due to the manager’s non-constant absolute risk aversion), the stock price Kc
1 has an
additional (indirect) eﬀect on the manager’s dividend decision and thus on the optimal
r¤
d.34
Stochastic interest rate ˜ r¤
I
In case of a dividend protection with the stochastic interest rate e r¤
I as deﬁned in (13),
the manager’s expected utility E[U(f W)] is given by
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general condition (A-3) (for any rX and pM) can be written as
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¡
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1+k d Cov[U0(f W); ˜ r] = 0.
34As the manager can only decide about D and therefore not about the allocation of his complete
”budget”, the results from the analysis of standard portfolio problems (see e.g. Merton (1982), pp
612-618) cannot be easily applied.
22e rI = i + ¯(e m ¡ i) = e r ¡e "
In the following, assume that the options will almost surely be in the money at t = 2,
so that we can approximate the derivate with respect to D by
(A-6)
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If pM = k, it can be shown that there will only be an interior maximum for Dopt,
0 < Dopt < CF, if ¸ is strictly positive. As the agent’s incentive to invest into ﬁrm
speciﬁc risk ˜ " tends to be the larger, the larger is the probability that the options
expire unexercised, this compensation ¸ in r¤
I tends to be the lower, the larger the risk
incentive from the options’ limited liability.
A comparison of dividend protection with a determinitic rate r¤
d on the one hand and
a stochastic rate ˜ r¤
I on the other is diﬃcult. For a preliminary analysis, let the dividend
protection be designed such that, if pM = k, Dopt = CF is an interior maximum
for E[U(f W)] for both r¤
d and ˜ r¤
I. Obviously, from the shareholders’ perspective, the
manager in either case tends to underinvest, since he would not reduce Dopt to Dopt = 0
if pM increased to a level pM > k. Whether dividend protection based on ˜ r¤
I is preferred
to dividend protection based on r¤
d now depends on how strongly Dopt depends on pM.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we receive
(A-7)
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Both (A-7) and (A-8) are negative, i.e. the manager will reduce dividends if internal
investments become more valuable – as is desired by the shareholders. Comparing (A-7)
and (A-8) shows that they have structurally diﬀerent denominators.35 The denominator
of (A-7) includes the squared diﬀerences e r¡r¤
d = e rI +e "¡r¤
d, whereas the denominator
35(A-7) and (A-8) also diﬀer with respect to the numerators, as the manager’s wage W is not
identical in either case. Though, the absolute amount of this diﬀerence should be relatively small in
comparison with the diﬀerence in the denominators.
23of (A-8) only includes the squared noise term e " (plus ¸). Hence, the larger ¯ (i.e. the
ﬁrm’s systematic risk), the larger is the absolute value of the denominator of (A-7)
compared to the absolute value of the denominator of (A-8): the risk included in e r¤
I
but not in r¤
d (and therefore ﬁltered out by e r¤
I but not by r¤
d) increases as ¯ gets larger.
As a result, the manager tends to react more strongly to a change in pM if e r¤
I is used
for dividend protection instead of r¤
d. This relation still tends to hold if one relaxes the
simplifying assumptions we made. So, in general, the manager’s dividend decision will
be more sensitive to pM and thus closer to the ﬁrst best dividend policy if e r¤
I is used
for dividend protection instead of r¤
d.
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